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CHICAGO-KENT' LAW REVIEW
V. FAMILY LAW
Final nullification of the so-called "Heart Balm" Act1 oc-
curred during the past year through the decision in Heck v.
SchUpp, 2 an action for alienation of affections.8 The primary
ground relied upoq was the same one previously pointed out,
to-wit: the content of the statute was not fairly revealed in the
title,4 but the court also adverted to the fact that the statute would
serve to put a premium on violations of moral law for offenders
would be free to pursue a course of conduct without fear of
punishment, hence also violated that part of the Bill of Rights
guaranteeing a "certain remedy" in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs.5 Legislature response to the decision may be observed
in three new statutes restricting damages in civil actions for
alienation of affections,6 for breach of promise to marry,7 and
for criminal conversation" to the actual damages sustained. No
punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages are hereafter to be
allowed. In the case of suits for breach of promise to marry, the
plaintiff must also serve notice of intention to sue within three
months of the alleged breach and then bring the action within one
year.9
Paralleling the decision in the case last mentioned is the
holding of the Appellate Court for the Second District in Johnson
v. Luhman'° wherein a complaint by a minor to recover damages
for alienation of the parent's affections was held to state a cause
of action despite the objection that the infant's claim was a novel
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 246.1 et seq.
2394 Ill. 296, 68 N. E. (2d) 464 (1946), noted in 47 Col. L. Rev. 503, 42 Ill.
L. Rev. 233.
3 See also Zaremba v. Skurdialis, 395 Ill. 437, 70 N. E. (2d) 617 (1947). Other
portions of the statute had been declared unconstitutional in People v. Mahumed,
681 I1. 81, 44 N. E. (2d) 911 (1942).
4 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13.
5 Ibid., Art. II, § 19.
6 Laws 1947, p. 796, S. B. 562; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 68, § 34 et seq.
7 Laws 1947, p. 1181, S. B. 563; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 89, § 25 et seq.
8 Laws 1947, p. 800, S. B. 552; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 68, § 41 et seq.
9 The contents of the notice are specified in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 89, § 28.
10 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E. (2d) 810 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGo-KENT L&w
REvIEw 260 and 36 Il. B. J. 84.
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one without legal support. Justification for that holding was said
to rest on the same provision of the Bill of Rights, on the decision
in Daily v. Parker," and on the fact that to hold otherwise would
be "contrary to all sense of justice."" It should be noticed, how-
ever, that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia thinks differently, for it dismissed an analogous complaint in
the case of McMillan v. Taylor13 and refused to follow the Daily
decision. The law, in this respect, is clearly in a state of flux and
desperately in need of that crystallization which can be provided
only by a decision of the highest court or by legislation on the
point.
Several issues with regard to divorce law were passed upon.
The case of Ollman v. Ollman14 is noteworthy for the court there
repudiated certain expressions found in earlier cases to the effect
that the defense of condonation, being an affirmative defense, had
to be specially pleaded otherwise the defendant would be precluded
from urging the same even though the fact thereof be revealed
in the evidence. 15 The former view was rejected in favor of the
interest of the state in maintaining the integrity and permanence
of the marriage relation and the trial judge was directed, when-
ever in the course of the divorce trial it appeared that the action
was collusive or barred, to "inquire, of its own motion, as the
representative of the State, into the facts and circumstances and
to act in accordance with the facts thus developed,"16 regardless
of the state of the pleadings.
The question as to whether or not the remarriage of the
recipient of alimony under a lump-sum alimony and property
settlement terminates the right to collect the remaining install-
ments due thereunder was again raised in Kohl v. Kohl.17  The
11152 F. (2d) 174 (1945). But see Heindl, "A Remedy for all Injuries?" 25
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 90.
12 330 Ill. App. 598 at 604, 71 N. E. (2d) 810 at 813.
13 160 F. (2d) 221 (1946).
14396 Ill. 176, 71 N. E. (2d) 50 (1947).
15 See, for example, Lipe v. Lipe, 327 Il1. 39, 158 N. E. 411 (1927), and Klekamp
v. Klekamp, 275 Ill. 98, 113 N. E. 852 (1916).
16396 Ill. 176 at 183, 71 N. E. (2d) 50 at 53.
1 330 Ill. App. 284, 71 N. E. (2d) 358 (1947).
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original decree therein had found the existence of such a settle-
ment but the terms thereof had not been incorporated in the
decree. After certain payments had been made, the divorced wife
remarried so the defendant promptly sought a modification of the
decree to excuse him from the obligation of further payments. He
relied on the decision in Banek v. Banck, s but the court dis-
tinguished the holding therein on the ground that that case dealt
with a lump-sum settlement of alimony only whereas, in the instant
case, the settlement covered property rights. The case of Drangle
v. Lindauer 9 had offered a road by which to by-pass the ruling
in the Banck case. The court has now seemingly improved that
road.
Restraint against the threat to institute colorable divorce
proceedings in a foreign state had been upheld in the separate
maintenance case of Kahn v. Kahn20 on the ground that, once
jurisdiction has been acquired, the local courts are empowered to
retain that jurisdiction by the use of even so stringent a remedy
as injunction if that becomes necessary. The case of Russell v.
Russell21 now carries that doctrine over to cases where the defend-
ant in the local action has actually commenced and is actively
prosecuting the foreign divorce suit so long as the foreign domicile
is fraudulently established and the local proceedings had been
begun before the foreign suit. The efficacy of such a remedy in
contrast to the doubtful one of proving the foreign decree to be
null and void is obvious.
Decisions such as the one in the Kahn case necessarily pre-
suppose that the local court has jurisdiction both as a matter of
law and also over the parties to the litigation. Two other divorce
cases, therefore, become significant for they throw light on the
point of jurisdiction over divorce as a matter of law. In Conrad
v. Conrad,22 the Supreme Court held that a city court could grant
1s322 Ill. App. 369, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 276.
19323 Ill. App. 23, 54 N. E. (2d) 751 (1944). Leave to appeal denied.
20325 Ill. App. 137, 59 N. E. (2d) 874 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAw
Ravmw 43-4.
21329 Ill. App. 580, 70 N. E. (2d) 70 (1946), noted in 36 Ill. B. J. 191.
22 396 Il. 101, 71 N. E. (2d) 54 (1947).
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a divorce based on a charge of desertion provided the plaintiff
took up valid residence in the city after desertion had begun but
before the full period of desertion had run. It indicated that it
was not necessary that the original act of leaving occur within
the city to bring the case within the jurisdictional factors laid
down by the decision in Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad Com-
pany23 since the cause of action did not accrue until the requisite
period of time had expired. The holding in Govan v. Govan,24
however, would indicate that suit may be maintained in a city
court in the county of plaintiff's residence, at least since the 1943
amendment to the city courts statute which had deleted the phrase
''arising in said city,"25 even though the parties do not reside in
the city and the basis for the divorce arose elsewhere, at least so
long as the defendant files a written appearance in the pro-
ceeding.26
One interesting point concerning custody of children of di-
vorced parents came up for consideration. The case of Kulan v.
Anderson27 had held that, as between the surviving parent, other-
wise fit and proper, and a sister of the deceased parent, it was
improper to divide the custody of children between the immediate
and the collateral relatives. That decision was followed in Luc-
chesi v. Lucchesi8 where the trial court was declared to have acted
in error when dividing custody of a minor child between the
divorced mother and the paternal grandparents, even though the
latter were trustees over an estate left by the deceased parent
for the benefit of the minor child. The court, however, indicated
that a reasonable visitation order would have been entirely proper
and could not constitute a material abridgement of the surviving
parent's custodial rights.
23379 Il1. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942), noted in 21 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
116. The decision in Riddlesbarger v. Riddlesbarger, 324 App. 176, 57 N. E. (2d)
901 (1944), was distinguished on the ground that the parties there involved
never, at any time, either jointly or separately resided in the city.
24 331 Il1. App. 372, 73 N. E. (2d) 163 (1947).
25 Laws 1943, p. 578, H. B. 471. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 37, § 333.
26 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 6.
27300 Ill. App. 267, 20 N. E. (2d) 987 (1939), noted in 15 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
R"V1Ew 17-8.
28 330 Ill. App. 506, 71 N. E. (2d) 920 (1947).
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An appalling increase in the divorce rate observed in recent
years, particularly in metropolitan centers, together with the multi-
plication of problems growing out of such broken marriages led
to a sincere movement to remedy conditions through legislation
designed to guarantee a more deep-sighted investigation in the
genuineness of suits for divorce, the promotion of reconciliation,
and the enforcement of decrees for alimony and support money.
The key measure was Senate Bill 415 but a number of other stat-
utes were also passed to amended other statutes to produce con-
formity in the operation of the plan. 29 Unfortunately, the entire
series of bills was designed to have operative effect only in Cook
County and for this reason the entire structure was exposed to
attack on constitutional grounds. It should be noted that the
entire reform fell, not in the period of this survey, when the
Supreme Court found a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against special or local laws.30 One of these measures, probably a
casualty by implication, was designed to overcome a present de-
fect in alimony awards. If personal jurisdiction of the defendant
can be acquired, an order for periodic alimony is valid and, on
proper showing, can be modified from time to time. In the absence
of personal jurisdiction, any alimony order would be void hence
it has become the practice to grant divorce on default based on
publication without alimony if the plaintiff elects to take such a
decree. Any attempt to reopen such a decree, if personal jurisdic-
tion can later be acquired, would generally be a nullity for alimony
must rest upon the idea that it is a substitute for the duty to
support, hence can only be granted as an incident to the termina-
tion of the relationship of husband and wife. As that relationship
has been abrogated by the default decree, the court is powerless
to grant alimony at some later occasion. The measure in question
was designed to cure that fault by making every such decree
merely a conditional one as to the alimony feature, thereby per-
2 9 Laws 1947. p. 813, S. B. 415; Iil. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 37, § 105.1 et seq. See
also Laws 1947, p. 818, S. B. 417: p. 1093, S. B. 418; p. 1184, S. B. 416; p. 989,
S. B. 419, and p. 1700, S. B. 420. These measures appeared in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947
as Ch. 40, §§ 6, 14, 16 and 19; Ch. 68, §§ 22 and 23.1; Ch. 90, §§ 1, 2, 6, 7 and 9;
Ch. 53, § 38, and Ch. 127, § 168-1, respectively.
30 See Hunt v. County of Cook, 398 Ill. 412, 76 N. E. (2d) 48 (1947), wherein
the court found a violation of Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22.
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mitting the exercise of jurisdiction if and when it could be ac-
quired. 1 The net result would have been that "no decree would
ever be final on the question of alimony short of an express waiver,
a denial of alimony, or a recital of alimony or property settle-
ment. ' '3 2 The entire series of bills did contain many desirable
features beside the one mentioned, so it is to be hoped that they
will be re-enacted after elimination of the unconstitutional fea-
tures. One measure which appears to have survived grants to
the court the power to restrain any third person, party to the
suit, from doing or threatening any act calculated to obstruct a
reconciliation of the parties to the marriage .3
VI. PROPERTY
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
By far the most important contribution to the law of real
property was made by legislative action in adopting a new act
dealing with rights of entry and possibilities of reverter such as
arise after conveyance of a fee simple on condition subsequent.1
The general purpose of that statute is to provide a means by
which such rights may be released or destroyed, a purpose the
desirability of which cannot be questioned, particularly by any
practitioner who has been faced with passing upon the validity
of a title encumbered thereby. Issues will undoubtedly arise as
to the constitutionality of such statute insofar as it may be ap-
plied to deeds executed before the enactment thereof. In that
respect, reference is made to an excellent discussion on the subject
appearing elsewhere which contains so complete a treatment of
the entire subject that repetition would be pure superfluity. 2
Except for that statute, debatable legal questions growing
out of ownership of land or rights therein have been relatively
31 Laws 1947, p. 818, S. B. 417; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 19.
32 See Goldblatt, "Matrimonial Law," 36 Ii1. B. J. 104 at 105. A reading of this
article is recommended.
z3 Laws 1947, p. 817, S. B. 421; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 13.
1 Laws 1947, p. 659, S. B. 347; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, § 37b et seq.
2 See Denissen, "The Illinois Reverter Act," 36 Ill. B. J. 263-71.
